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ABSTRACT 
In 2016 the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) published a 
“Bill of Rights.” This article considers and analyzes what is at 
stake in a global professional clinical organization developing 
such a document that purports to support its efforts to tackle 
the social injustices experienced by people with mental health 
issues globally. It critically examines the text of the Bill and 
suggests that, while the document promises serious engage-
ment with human rights (as distinct from ethics), it fails to meet 
existing international human rights standards. For the WPA to 
be a present and engaged partner in the implementation of 
international human rights standards it should not merely 
encourage governments to take action, but start with inward- 
facing tasks. These include establishing minimum human rights- 
based criteria for its own members and holding them to 
account, so as to nudge psychiatrists towards a human rights- 
based approach that would benefit people with mental health 
issues around the world. 
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Social justice for people with mental health issues 
There is a long history of struggle by those who have received psychiatric 
diagnoses both to render visible and to combat the profound discrimination 
and inequality they experience [1]. Such discrimination is now more widely 
acknowledged across multiple domains—including psychiatry and other 
clinical specialities. This is evidenced by the 2016 special edition of the 
International Review of Psychiatry on “Social Justice for People with Mental 
Illness”[2]. The edition points out how discrimination against people with 
mental health issues, “is widespread and much more common in low income 
countries,” and calls for steps to be taken to roll out treatments to people who 
currently have no access. The articles in the special issue highlight that laws 
around the world prevent people with mental health issues from exercising 
human rights, such as the right to work [3] and the right to vote [4]. Dinesh 
Bhugra, the President of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) notes that 
CONTACT Oliver Lewis o.lewis@leeds.ac.uk School of Law, University of Leeds, The Liberty Building, Leeds 
LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.  
© 2017 Oliver Lewis and Felicity Callard. Published with license by Taylor & Francis 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ 
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited. 
these “discriminatory laws may well reflect underlying stigma against 
individuals with mental illness at a number of levels” [5]. He urges, “national 
associations to explore psychiatry’s contract with representative policy- 
makers, stakeholders, patients, their carers and families, and their groups.” 
We welcome this commitment of the WPA’s leadership to highlighting social 
injustices faced by people with mental health issues. 
The special edition also contains a “Bill of Rights for Individuals with 
Mental Illness” [6], authored by Bhugra, who, the article emphasizes, “alone 
is responsible for the content and writing of the paper”. To date, the Bill 
has been endorsed by the Asian and Latin American federations of psychiatric 
associations, psychiatric associations in Armenia and the Emirates, the Royal 
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, and several British 
mental health NGOs such as Mind and SANE.1 In this article, we consider 
and analyze what is at stake for a global professional clinical organization 
to publish such a document intended to support its efforts to tackle the social 
injustices experienced by its beneficiaries. 
The World Psychiatric Association’s engagements with ethics  
and human rights 
The WPA has, historically, been at some distance from human rights 
discourse. It has tended, rather, to approach normative questions and 
problems affecting psychiatry through the lens of ethics. The 1977 Declaration 
of Hawaii [7], which was the first WPA position statement regarding such 
issues, “laid down … ethical guidelines for psychiatrists all over the world” 
[italics added]. Clarence Blomquist—who drafted the text, and who was 
trained in both psychiatry and practical philosophy—noted “the sometimes 
diverse approaches to medical ethics and the physician/patient relationship 
in Europe and the U.S.,” and explained that he tried, when drafting, “to gain 
more concern for the patients’ autonomy and right to participate in decisions 
about their own lives and health but to avoid a rigid legalistic system and to 
give place for man’s legitimate need for trust, confidence and care” [8]. Over a 
decade later, in 1989, the WPA published a “Statement and Viewpoints on the 
Rights and Legal Safeguards of the Mentally Ill” which, at times, mobilized a 
language of rights [9]. It was at least in part a response to what had been 
perceived by the WPA as an “anti-psychiatric” tone [10] within the preamble 
and articles that had been proposed in the Daes report [11], published in 
1986, which was the first of two reports resulting from the United Nations 
(U.N.) Commission for Human Rights appointing two Special Rapporteurs 
to investigate and report on the lamentable conditions in institutions for 
people with mental health issues and intellectual disabilities. 
The 1989 document described itself as a “condensed catalogue of the 
WPA’s Executive Committee and Ethics Committee statements and 
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viewpoints that largely reflect the body of general guidelines on the rights of 
mental patients” [italics added] [9]. The deployment of “largely” makes clear 
that the Statement and Viewpoints departed in certain respects from other 
contemporaneous documents specifying the rights of people with mental 
health issues. The Madrid Declaration on Ethical Standards for Psychiatric 
Practice (first approved in 1996, and with most recent amendments made 
in September 2011 in Buenos Aires) maintained the focus on and language 
of ethics [12]. It alluded to law only at a few key moments, for example in 
specifying that, “[w]hen the patient is gravely disabled, incapacitated and/or 
incompetent to exercise proper judgment because of a mental disorder, the 
psychiatrists should consult with the family and, if appropriate, seek legal 
counsel, to safeguard the human dignity and the legal rights of the patient.” 
This statement departs from human rights guarantees that had been in place 
for five years by the time the Buenos Aires amendments were made: the 2006 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) states that 
all people with mental health issues (and other disabilities) have the right to 
legal capacity, meaning that everyone has equal rights irrespective of a 
psychiatrist’s opinion of the appropriateness of the person’s preferences or 
of the nature or degree of the person’s mental health issue. 
In its Bill, the WPA promises serious engagement with human rights, as 
distinct from ethics. This is to be welcomed, as the implementation of 
international norms takes place at the grassroots—in communities, schools, 
hospitals, and so on—and does not stop with standard setting. Indeed, the 
work of implementation is even more complex, as standards require enforce-
ment mechanisms that hold people and organizations to account for alleged 
violations through formal legal processes. 
In tracking the linguistic and potentially substantive movement on the part 
of the WPA towards rights, we should first of all recall that the relationship 
between (bio)ethics and human rights is both complex and vexed. Of the 
many differences between the two that Richard Ashcroft, an expert in both 
domains, has identified and analyzed [13], one is particularly apposite to 
our discussion here. From the perspective of human rights advocates, it might 
be expressed as what Ashcroft calls the “political quietism of bioethics.” From 
the side of (bio)ethics, it would be the opposite: in other words, for “the 
professions, for governments, and for certain kinds of institutions (hospitals, 
research institutes, universities, some industrial concerns),” bioethics might 
rather “represent a more attractive vehicle for consultation and dispute 
resolution than would a human rights-oriented institution, precisely because 
of the lower ideological temperature of bioethics relative to human rights and 
the lesser likelihood that it can be taken up by a possibly rather protean social 
movement.” 
The history of the WPA standards and declarations bears this out. A frame-
work of ethics, as first formalized in Blomquist’s drafting of the Hawaii 
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Declaration, arose in the midst of fraught and politicized struggles over the 
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. It is generally accepted by the psychi-
atric community that at that time, a “code of ethics was the only means to rec-
oncile the various member countries on issues of misuse of psychiatry” [14]. 
What is the situation, though, today? Does the Bill of Rights signal a 
substantial engagement by the WPA with human rights, or is its invocation 
of the language of rights belied by its cleaving to longer-held commitments 
and positions that it has developed through the prism of psychiatric ethics? 
The purpose of and the audience for the “Bill of Rights” 
Our contention is twofold. First, the Bill only partially commits to existing 
international human rights standards, and second, it is unlikely to have much 
traction because it contains no accountability and monitoring mechanism. 
First then, the Bill invokes international human rights law: its second 
paragraph expresses support for the “efforts of the international community 
as expressed through various international human rights Covenants and 
Conventions, and, more particularly, the 2006 United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).” However, it excises many 
rights that are more challenging to psychiatry. It does so in the face of a range 
of publications (by lawyers, clinicians, social scientists, philosophers, mental 
health service users, and diverse advocacy groups) that interrogate the 
relationship between international human rights law and psychiatric practice 
and that offer potential ways forward in relation to the new legal and ethical 
landscape opened by the CRPD [15–27]. Through these excisions, the Bill 
seeks to maintain an aspiration for a “lower ideological temperature” that is 
less likely to inflame some of its national associations. Perhaps individual psy-
chiatrist members of those national associations are more likely to be nudged 
into human-rights-compliant practice by the carrot of ethics than the stick of 
the law. The excision can be read as deeply ideological within the wider, het-
erogeneous mental health landscape, wherein it is hard not to interpret the 
invisibility of certain issues that are particularly contentious flash-points in 
mental health—as we discuss below—as in some way a motivated decision. 
Our second contention is that the Bill is unlikely to change practice on the 
ground because it fails to establish monitoring mechanisms or accountability 
procedures. The Bill references the CRPD, an international treaty that con-
tains provisions obliging governments to implement a range of human rights 
(Articles 10–30). The CRPD does not stop at setting standards, but rather it 
enjoins States to establish structures that make it more likely that the Conven-
tion will be implemented. These include a governmental focal point to carry 
out joined-up policymaking (Article 33(1)), an independent mechanism to 
monitor progress in implementing the Convention (Article 33(2)), and a duty 
to involve people with disabilities (including those with mental health issues 
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and their representative organizations) in this pursuit (Article 33(3)). It also 
contains duties on governments to fund research and development in univer-
sal design and new technologies (Article 4(1)(f) and (g)), to provide rights- 
based training to professionals involved in providing services to people with 
disabilities (Article 4(1)(i)), and to carry out comprehensive law reform and 
to mainstream disability (including mental health) across governmental 
policies and programs (Article 4(1)(c)). In this way, the CRPD lists not only 
normative aspirations but detailed programmatic tasks too. It establishes an 
international monitoring scheme whereby each State Party is assessed by a 
specific U.N. Committee on a regular basis (Articles 34–36), and the relation-
ship between the Committee and governments is itself regulated (Article 37). 
In contrast, the WPA’s Bill of Rights is devoid of any monitoring or 
accountability mechanism, prompting questions about how the WPA can 
measure the commitment of its member associations and how the public 
can, in turn, hold the WPA to account. Omitting a feedback loop that could 
measure the Bill’s impact on people with mental health issues on the ground is 
a missed opportunity. 
The audience of the Bill is difficult to ascertain. It calls on governments to 
take action, but governments are under an obligation to implement inter-
national human rights treaties they have ratified, irrespective of pronounce-
ments by nongovernmental organizations such as the WPA. If nudging 
governments were the Bill’s only function, the WPA would have no need to 
issue such a document. The Bill seems to speak more to the WPA’s members 
(regional, national, and subnational associations of psychiatrists), encouraging 
them to engage in law and policy reform. Given that governments are 
supposed to hold psychiatrists to account, the Bill is more a nod directly to 
psychiatrists. In this respect, the Bill follows clearly in the tradition of the 
WPA’s standards and declarations, which largely interpellate psychiatrists as 
those responsible for upholding ethical practice. 
The term “Bill of Rights” dates from a 1689 Act of the English Parliament. 
Today, it is generally understood to mean a document endorsed by a country’s 
parliament, which enshrines rights and commits that country’s government to 
take certain actions and to refrain from taking others. In the late 1970s, it was 
suggested that doctors should establish a Bill of Rights to regulate themselves 
so as to uphold their professional autonomy [28]. There are a few other exam-
ples of nongovernmental proclamations [29], but we found no examples of a 
global professional group unilaterally anointing rights upon their beneficiaries 
rather than collating rights for their members. Indeed, such Bills of Rights 
have, on occasion, received criticism precisely for wielding the language of 
rights. Not only has the (U.S.) Library Bill of Rights, for example, been 
described as “rife with examples of rhetoric unsupported by the legal princi-
ples that usually undergird ‘rights’”; it has been heavily criticized for “the false 
representation that [it] serves as a legal guarantee or as an accurate reflection 
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of current legal doctrine”[30]. The WPA’s Bill of Rights—authored by one 
person granting rights that do not mirror international human rights law, 
to everyone with mental health issues in the world—could be criticized on 
similar grounds. 
The document calls for “ALL governments” (emphasis in the original) to 
end discrimination on the basis of mental health status. Rights violations 
happen partly because of systemic inequalities and a lack of attention by 
governments, and so reiterating governmental obligations is simple enough. 
More difficult is changing practice, which the Bill steers away from attempt-
ing. Domains exercising public power—police, prisons, education, social 
work—have undergone reforms for a multitude of reasons. These include 
public commitments from people who lead those bodies, but norms are rarely 
sufficient to change behavior. To reduce torture around the world, for 
example, practice has been regulated by law, and professionals held to account 
by way of statutory requirements for taped police interviews, access to 
advocates, and monitoring of police stations [31]. 
Missed opportunities 
Progressive global leadership of psychiatry is central to the larger imperative 
of protecting the rights of people with mental health issues, but the Bill of 
Rights is a missed opportunity for the WPA to be a galvanizing agent of 
change. The Bill could, for example, have set out a commitment for every 
psychiatrist to undergo human rights training (implementing a key CRPD 
State obligation; see Article 4(1)(i)), which includes trainers with mental 
health issues (Article 4(3) of the CRPD). Most clubs have minimum entry 
criteria as well as accountability mechanisms to keep their membership in 
line. As a club of national psychiatric associations that vary widely in 
their commitment to human rights, the WPA could have used the Bill to 
establish basic minimum entry requirements that each association would need 
to meet before it is accepted, or demitted on transgression. For example, if the 
WPA’s position is that electroshock therapy given in its unmodified form 
(without anaesthesia or muscle relaxants) breaches minimum standards, 
it would eject its member the Indian Psychiatric Society for endorsing this 
practice [32]. 
The Bill suffers from substantive problems too, as it cherry-picks from well- 
established international human rights law. It supports living “independently 
in the community as other citizens,” but it appears to fall short of endorsing 
“full inclusion and participation in the community,” required by Article 19 of 
the CRPD, and which entails a more complex set of obligations including 
access to housing stock, accessible transport, inclusive education, and so on 
(this also applies equally to people who are not citizens of the jurisdiction 
in question). Another example is the right to health. Human rights law splits 
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economic, social, and cultural rights such as the right to health into four 
parts: accessibility, availability, acceptability, and quality—a formulation that 
the World Health Organization has used in operational guidance [33]. The 
Bill of Rights specifies that the right to health should be accessible and avail-
able, but is silent about whether healthcare should be acceptable or of satisfac-
tory quality. Highlighting the omission of two words may seem pedantic, but 
the WPA has issued a text aligned to human rights law, a domain where 
words matter as they carry specific interpretive meaning. This particular 
omission gives the impression that the WPA is more concerned with the mass 
roll-out of treatments than the user experience. 
Similarly, the document omits the word “torture” when setting out the 
right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. 
It is uncontroversial to state that some psychiatric practice may be considered 
torture: unmodified electro-convulsive therapy is an example [34, 35]. 
Allowing readers of the Bill to infer that the WPA is ignoring well-established 
and deep-rooted problems in parts of psychiatry risks the organization being 
perceived as a bad-faith negotiator in a complex change process. Psychiatric 
leadership is urgently needed to end torture and other forms of ill-treatment 
carried out in the name of psychiatry, science, and treatment [36]. For a 
document called a “Bill of Rights” to omit this acknowledgement is not an 
encouraging starting point. Other rights are also missing. While the WPA 
is keen for people to be treated for mental health issues (this is—alongside 
access to physical healthcare—the top of the WPA’s list), the document says 
nothing about consent, one of the most important debates at the interface of 
psychiatry and rights (see Article 25(d) of the CRPD). Also absent is the right 
to rehabilitation, particularly important in underpinning the recovery of 
people who have spent time in psychiatric or social care institutions (see 
Article 26 of the CRPD). 
Given the often coercive nature of psychiatry [37], mental health service 
users should have access to complaints systems and the courts to seek redress 
for alleged violations of their rights (see Article 13 of the CRPD), yet the Bill is 
silent on justice. This may mean that some readers of the Bill infer—rightly or 
wrongly—that psychiatrists have some investment in limiting victims from 
complaining and taking cases against them. Instead of appearing to fear such 
litigation, the WPA should welcome it for the potential to expose bad practice, 
maintain minimum standards, and arguably to strengthen trust with mental 
health service users. 
The role of psychiatrists in implementing human rights 
While the Bill contains some welcome elements, our analysis suggests that it 
remains largely an exhortatory document, which does not, despite its title, 
significantly depart from the WPA’s earlier sets of ethical standards and 
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declarations, and from those documents’ address to clinical practitioners. It is 
difficult, too, not to be aware of the wider context in which this Bill of Rights 
was drafted. In the midst of often fractious public debate that is often ignorant 
about—if not hostile to—psychiatry in toto, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
psychiatry—not least in the form of the WPA—is keen to emphasize its pro-
fessionalism and the effectiveness of its treatments and practices. While this 
might help explain certain absences in the Bill (references to torture or access 
to complaints systems, for example), it does not excuse those absences within 
a document that expressly locates itself within and endorses the international 
human rights project. 
In conclusion, we are left troubled by the Bill because it ends up foreclosing 
any substantive engagement with the complex challenges—of coercion, insti-
tutionalization, consent, and ensuring full inclusion in the community—that 
face all those in the global mental health community. The CRPD has opened 
new norms, new possibilities, and new hopes for people with mental health 
issues, but hard thinking and hard work are needed for these to be realized, 
not least in relation to the clinical practice of psychiatry. 
A contribution from psychiatry was largely missing during the negotiation 
of the CRPD, but in its implementation psychiatry must be, and must be seen 
to be, a present and engaged partner. Both analytical and material resources 
from all stakeholders who are committed to ensuring social justice for people 
with mental health issues are indispensable. We welcome the efforts of those 
psychiatrists and other mental health clinicians who—often in collaboration 
with legal and advocacy organizations—have contributed clinical, analytical, 
and policy-related acuity to making progress with these difficult question 
[27, 38]. We look forward to psychiatry offering a more audible voice in mul-
tidisciplinary discussions over human rights in the future. 
For the WPA to play a useful part in this reform process, its first task 
should be to continue to reform itself—at the very least by establishing mini-
mum membership criteria aligned to international human rights standards 
and a mechanism for holding its member associations to account. Unless such 
action is taken, this Bill will likely generate some limited academic interest 
(such as our own article) but is less likely to have an impact on improving 
the lives of people with mental health issues. 
Search strategy and selection criteria 
Each author identified relevant legal instruments, ethical standards and 
declarations, as well as academic publications on human rights, ethics, and 
discrimination in relation to mental health issues and disability. Their signifi-
cance was agreed through consensus. The information presented from these 
materials and the arguments made in relation to them were agreed by both 
authors. 
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Note  
1. Several endorsements are listed on the WPA’s website: http://wpanet.org/WMMD16/ 
BillofRights_Mentalillness_FINAL.pdf. The Royal Australian and New Zealand College 
of Psychiatrists (RANZCP) endorsement is at https://www.ranzcp.org/News-policy/ 
News/New-Bill-of-Rights-to-safeguard-the-rights-of-peop.aspx.  
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